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1. Introduction 
Transportation of petroleum products by road truck creates numerous opportunities for 
hazardous materials to be accidentally released into the environment. Depending on the 
volume upon loss of containment (LOC), chemical properties, sensitivity of host environment 
and proximity of human presence, such releases have safety and environmental consequences. 
This is especially a problem in developing countries where often towns and villages are 
situated very close to major roads serving as key transport corridors thereby increasing 
accident vulnerability (Fabiano et al., 2002; Anifowose et al., 2011). Two different 
perspectives are often in conflict in the transportation of petroleum products: While operators 
are particularly interested in profit, the regulatory agencies are interested in ensuring public 
and environmental safety. Hence, proper accident investigation practices governed by risk 
assessment principles among operators and regulators are required in order to understand and 
prevent severe hazards posed by the dangerous properties of petroleum products transported 
by road (Lawler, 2005).  
Risk assessment of transportation of hazardous materials (such as petroleum products) has 
attracted research attention during the last 20 years (Yang et al., 2010) especially in the 
context  of safe transportation using pipelines (Dziubiński et al., 2006; Citro and Gagliardi, 
2012), railway (Liu et al., 2013; Saat et al., 2014)  and road (Verter and Kara, 2001; Fabiano 
et al., 2002; Fabiano et al., 2005; Gheorghe, 2006; Lieggio Junior, 2008; Bubbico et al., 2009; 
Centrone, 2009; Guo and Verma, 2010; Tomasoni et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010). Within the 
research conducted on transportation of hazmat on roads three approaches can be 
distinguished. The first approach is the development of frameworks for improving emergency 
responses based on road, weather, and traffic factors (Fabiano et al., 2005). The second is 
based on conducting survey and accident risk analysis from historic data to divulge accident 
characteristics such as frequency of occurrence, accident consequences, and identification of 
causal factors (Fabiano et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2013). The last approach 
focuses on the development of decision making frameworks aimed at improving choice of 
truck capacity (Guo and Verma, 2010) and route selection (Verter and Kara, 2001; Fabiano et 
al., 2002; Volkovas et al., 2005; Lieggio Junior, 2008). However, little attention has been 
given to developing risk assessment model for decision making in developing countries 
where the effectiveness of regulation for accident prevention and emergency preparedness 
and response is often constrained by limited regulatory resources (Aprioku, 2003).  
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Moreover, there is a need to have a risk assessment framework that exposes the financial 
implications of accidents involving petroleum product tankers. This is because due to the 
small and often fragmented character of petroleum product transport operators in developing 
countries, regulatory enforcement is often lacking and these companies cling to the 
perception that adhering to good safety and environmental standards is expensive. Hence, 
there is a need to uncover the real, and often high, but hidden costs of poor safety standards to 
operators via risk assessments.  
Using the case example of Nigeria, we present a regulatory improvement framework based 
on the identification of relative accident risk hotspots across states and evaluation of financial 
consequences of accidents involving petroleum product truck transport using fragmented 
spatiotemporal data. The framework will provide regulators with the means to effectively 
prioritize resources when regulating transportation of petroleum products. Similarly, by 
adding a financial dimension to the risk analysis, regulators can use the framework to prompt 
strong regulatory incentive for improving hazmat transport. 
2. Case example: petroleum product distribution in Nigeria 
The downstream subsector of petroleum industry in Nigeria is characterised by a complex 
assortment of infrastructure and processes including refining, distribution, transportation and 
retailing of petroleum products. The industry supplies about 40 million litres of petroleum 
products per day to an estimated 170 million people across 36 states and Abuja (NNPC, 2012) 
mainly via trucking operations (see Fig.1). In addition to the government owned retailing 
company (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation-Retail), there are 6 Major Marketers and 
over 10,200 Independent Marketers all involved in transportation and distribution of 
petroleum products (PPPRA, 2006). In 2012 the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC) 
reported the involvement of over 5000 petroleum product tankers in daily haulage on 
Nigerian roads, accounting for approximately 95% of the country’s petroleum product 
transport volume moving on the road system.   
This transport system has been largely responsible for accidents and disasters that pose risks 
to human safety and the environment (Dare et al., 2009; BBC, 2012). However, regulatory 
activities (including accident prevention, preparedness and response) have mainly been 
constrained due to inadequate funding. For instance, while the FRSC have safety 
requirements and guidelines for articulated lorry (tankers/trailers) operations in Nigeria that 
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covers registration, licencing and emergency preparedness their operations are not efficient 
(Oluwadiya et al., 2009; Ambituuni et al., 2014). This calls for enhanced identification of 
accident hotspots for effective regulatory resource prioritisation and distribution as a risk 
management strategy. A risk assessment model is therefore required in light of the limited 
access to good quality data which has often contributed to research limitation in Nigeria 
(Anifowose et al., 2012; Omodanisi et al., 2014).   
The highly articulated, small but politically sensitive nature of truck tanker operators in 
Nigeria (Majekodunmi, 2013), also typifies a case where a framework is required for 
integrating accident cost analysis so that regulators can build up a case to enforce good safety 
and environmental standards and also manage the risk perception of operators.  
 
 
Fig 1: Downstream structure of Nigerian petroleum industry (Note: pictures used in this diagram were obtained from public 
domain and used for illustrative purposes only. They do not represent any company’s facility) 
 
3. Method  
3.1 Data  
Data collection was a noticeable challenge for this article as it is for many studies in 
developing countries. As there is no public data base in Nigeria, 2318 accident reports were 
obtained from 4 different sources including: The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), 
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Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). These agencies are duty bound by 
law to document, investigate and respond to petroleum and road related accidents (Ambituuni 
et al., 2014). Fortunately, these reports spanned up to 6 years (2007 to 2012). The details 
(causes, consequences (fatality/casualties) and quantity of products spill) on each accident 
report obtained are comprehensive enough to give a contextual view of hazards, accident 
occurrence and severity. The reports cover accident/incidents involving truck tankers across 
the 36 Nigerian states and Abuja.  
Data representing yearly distribution and sales of petroleum products (Premium Motor Spirit 
(PMS), House Hold Kerosene (HHK) and Automotive Gas Oil (AGO)) across the states in 
Nigeria was obtained from NNPC reports, while petroleum product price regime details were 
obtained from  Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) (see Table 1 for data 
and data sources).  
Data Type Data Source 
Accident reports across 36 state and Abuja from 2007 to 
2012. 
DPR, NNPC, FRSC and NEMA 
Quantity/price of petroleum products consumed (PMS, HHK 
and AGO) in Nigeria. 
2012 NNPC sale records and PPPRA reports 
Estimated cost of fatality, injury and environmental damage. Battelle (Battelle, 2001) 
Table 1. Data sources 
3.1.1 Data exploration  
The accident reports obtained were first organised and arranged according to year, month and 
date and time of occurrence. The records were further categorised based on location of 
occurrence across the states. By tabularising the details of numbers of fatalities, injuries, 
vehicles involved and type and quantity of products involved within each accident, a 
contextual accident consequence data was established. States were arranged in alphabetical 
order and identification numbers 1 to 37 allocated. The data was then imported into SPSS 
where it was subjected to various statistical tests within the framework described in section 
3.2.  
By summing up the total distributed volume of PMS, HHK and AGO in each of the states and 
then dividing by 33,000 (a typical truck load in litres), it was possible to estimate the number 
of truck tanker loads delivering products in each state per year. As the spatial connectivity of 
the pipeline network in Nigeria has been completely lost following incidents of vandalism 
(Anifowose et al., 2011) and since there is no retail station directly connected to the pipeline 
network, transportation of petroleum products to retail stations in Nigeria solely depends on 
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the truck tanker system. This estimation assumes that at a particular point in the lifecycle of 
the total volume of petroleum product used per year the product was transported using a truck 
tanker. This data was later used for normalised relative accident frequency computation. 
Since records of total product distribution by state can only be traced back to 2009, only four 
years data could be used for this purpose.  
In analysing accident financial impact, categories that can be estimated within the data set 
were first selected. The categories included: fatality, injury, product loss and environmental 
damage. Other categories such as: clean-up, property damage, evacuation of victims and 
traffic incident delay costs were excluded due to the limited nature of information in the 
reports.  
Since the risk assessment framework is designed for enhancing regulatory activities, we 
integrated part of the study discussion with classification of stakeholders and their key 
interest within the context of transportation and distribution of petroleum product in Nigeria. 
For example, FRSC is the federal road safety regulator and is interested in road safety across 
all transport activities (including petroleum product transportation) in Nigeria. Similarly, 
DPR regulates all petroleum operations including transportation and distribution of products 
from labelling and packaging to loading and unloading operations (see Fig. 2 for illustrative 
details). This allowed discussions to be centred on how the framework can enhance 
regulatory activities using the contextual information on the study location.  
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Department of Petroleum Resources
(DPR) 
Federal Road Safety Commission
(FRSC)
Stakeholders (Regulators)  
Key: A= Accountable, P=Participants/Input required, 
 
State Fire Service Departments   
National Emergency Management 
Agency (NEMA) 
Supervising all petroleum industry operations 
being carried out under licences and leases in 
the country in order to ensure compliance with 
the applicable regulations in line with good oil 
producing practice 
Transport, store, and retail petroleum and allied 
products to customers 
Eliminate, minimize and respond to accidents 
and fire disaster on highways and advising the 
Federal and State Governments, and 
communities on petroleum product hazards 
P
P
Key Interests 
Major Petroleum Marketers 
(MOMAN) 
 
Independent Petroleum Marketers 
(IPMAN)
 
Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC)  
Transporters and Depot Operetors
 
A
AP
Stakeholders (Operators) 
A
National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA)  
 
check oil spill through, containment, recovery, 
and remediation/restoration 
A P
Fig. 2. Interest and classification of the stakeholders involved 
 3.1.2 Data constraints and study limitation 
Typical of research in developing countries, this study is constrained by availability and 
access to good comprehensive quality data. Similar limitation has been reported by 
Anifowose et al. (2012) and Lawler (2005) where age, format, reliability, access, quantity 
and quality of data presented constraints to research. Hence, the analysed variables in this 
study solely depend on variables extracted from the fragmented spatiotemporal data obtained. 
Working with the available data is in fact a fundamental objective of the objective of the 
framework presented in this study.  
Obtaining comprehensive data is especially challenging in the study country due to the 
secretive nature of the petroleum industry (Amundsen, 2010). For example, the researcher 
experienced deliberate deletion of some report details from the reports obtained from DPR 
due to confidentiality claims. Also, all the reports obtained only cover accidents and incidents 
involving PMS, HHK and AGO. Perhaps, this could be because these three products form the 
bulk of products used across the country. Hence, with this data, it is not possible to evaluate 
the contribution of transportation of other petroleum products. Collecting accident reports 
from 4 different sources also meant that each report had to be cross-referenced using date, 
time, location of occurrence, and/or registration numbers of vehicles involved with all the 
7 
 
reports to sieve out duplications. Therefore, where such clear distinction was not established, 
the report details were classified based on the only and/or best parameter(s) available. 
Consequently, accident in this study is defined as an event that occurs when the tanker 
transporting petroleum product is involved in a collision and/or any event that has led to spill 
or fire or explosion. Any accident involving the shipment would be considered as an accident 
regardless of whether there was LOC. This is represented in the event tree in Fig. 3. 
There is also the lack of homogeneity of the data used in cost estimation. The dollar values 
used for estimation of accident cost impact variables was obtained from a study conducted in 
the US. As there are no established estimates within the Nigerian context, this was the best 
internationally accepted option we could establish. Certainly, using data from the case 
country would have been more desirable as it would have given a specific cost analysis 
related to the risk-cost perception of the case country. Thus, while the study results would not 
be possible without the availability of these data, limitations of the study can in part be linked 
to their variegated nature. 
Fig. 3. Accident event tree. Note: Although many of reports clearly stated the quantity of loss product due to 
accident event, only 74 of the reports identified specific classification of accident phenomena. This was used in 
the classification highlighted in red dotted lines. 
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3.2 Framework for data analysis 
The framework for data analysis in this study consists of two key risk assessment elements, 
both inspired by the set of data obtained: a) The risk assessment element consisting of: 
formulas for identification of accident causal factors;  and equations used for the computation 
of accident frequencies and accident casualty consequence, later used for accident risk 
quantification in section 4. b) Cost impact element comprising formulas for estimation of 
direct and indirect costs of accidents and computation of the yearly cost impact of accident 
and losses. 
3.2.1 Causal factor identification and classification 
Based on the reported cause of accident to regulators, we classified accident causal factors 
into human, non-human and unknown factors. Accident causal factors are factors that 
contribute to the frequency of accident in a given year. 
Total causal factor classification was therefore computed as: 
 Human factor (Hf) + Non-Human factor (Nf) + Unknown factor (Uf) (1a) 
Hf, Nf, and Uf values were extracted as: 
    Hf = DGD + TPI + AVA        (1b) 
where DGD is the factor caused by dangerous driving, wrongful overtaking, speed violation, 
route violation, drink driving and other traffic violations. TPI is accidents caused by third 
party interference on the road, i.e. human factors not caused by the driver and AVA is armed 
and violent attack such as armed robbery 
Nf = Mf + Br + Bw    (2) 
where Mf, Br and Bw are causal factors due to mechanical faults, bad road and bad weather 
respectively.  
3.2.2 Accident Frequency  
Since n number of accidents were reported in a geographical region (state) j in year y and the 
total quantity of petroleum product distributed and sold in that state in year y was recorded 
(as Ʊ𝑗 litres), then the total number of tanker trips kj to the state can be estimated by diving Ʊ𝑗 
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by 33,000 litres (a typical tanker load). Using the formula of relative frequency, the 
frequency of accident per trip per year across each state was identified as: 
Accident frequency per trip (p) =
𝑛𝑗
𝑘𝑗
                                                      (3) 
Where 𝑛𝑗  is the number of accident in a state j and kj the number of trips to that state. The 
frequency value, however, depends on the assumption that the truck involved in the accident 
in that state was assigned to deliver product to the state and not just passing by.   
3.2.3 Relative accident consequence between states 
The data showed various accident locations i through to m across state j (i.e. i = 1, 2… m 
accident locations within state j) and casualty consequence q was recorded at each accident 
location i in state j. By defining qi,j per accident in terms of total numbers of: fatalities (qF,i,j) 
and injuries (qI,i,j), it was possible to evaluate the accident casualty consequence i.e: 
 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =  𝑞𝐹,𝑖,𝑗  +  𝑞𝐼,𝑖,𝑗                                                                   (4) 
And total casualty consequence Qj per year across state j is; 
          𝑄𝑗 = 𝑞1,𝑗 +  𝑞2,𝑗 +  𝑞3,𝑗+. . . + 𝑞𝑚,𝑗  = ∑ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
                 (5) 
Using equation 5 relative accident casualty consequences in different states were computed 
and compared to determine high risk states.  
The relative frequency of an accident having a given number of deaths was calculated using 
the accident totality statistics. Accordingly, we grouped all accidents (see section 4.3) based 
on number of fatalities and calculated the cumulative frequencies using the following 
equation: 
𝑝𝑎 =
∑ 𝑁𝑐
𝑥
𝑐=𝑎
∑ 𝑁𝑐
𝑥
𝑐=1
 .                (6) 
Where N is the number of deaths, Pa is the frequency of an accident with more than N deaths, 
x represents the total amount of categories or rankings, and Nc is the number of accidents in a 
given category c. This method was also used by Yang et al. (2010). 
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3.2.4 Accident and financial loss 
Using t as the value representing the corresponding financial consequences associated to 
accident in location i through to m within state j, we defined t with respect to fatalities (tF,i,j), 
injuries (tI,i,j), number of vehicles involved (tV,i,j), quantity of product loss (tPl,i,j), etc.  The 
financial accident consequence at location i in state j was therefore estimated as: 
 𝑡𝑖,𝑗 =            𝑡𝐹∙𝑞𝐹,𝑖,𝑗  + ⋯.                                                         (7) 
Total financial consequence T in state j per year was obtain using Eqn. 8 
  𝑇𝑗 = 𝑡1,𝑗 +  𝑡2,𝑗 +  𝑡3,𝑗+. . . + 𝑡𝑚,𝑗  = ∑ 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑚
𝑖=1
     (8) 
The total monetary sale value of petroleum product per year in state j is given as  𝑇𝑝𝑠𝑗 . 
Accident impact on sales in state j was then computed by deducting the total accident 
financial consequence (Tj) in that state from the total year monetary sale value of petroleum 
products (Tpsj) in that state.
11 
 
 
Year No. of 
accidents 
Fatality No. 
injured 
No. of 
persons 
involved 
No. of veh. 
involved 
No. caused by 
human 
factors 
No. caused by 
non-human 
factor 
Un-known 
factor 
Quantity of 
PMS loss (10
3
l) 
Quantity of 
AGO loss 
(10
3 
l) 
Quantity of 
HHK loss 
(10
3
 l) 
2007 232 369 741 1639 342 191 37 4 4095.4 510.7 528.4 
2008 352 434 1124 2467 518 281 62 9 6712.4 1029.4 893.4 
2009 486 434 1345 3038 665 390 82 14 9600.0 1045.5 642.2 
2010 415 519 1405 3108 686 317 85 13 7943.4 891.3 908.8 
2011 354 374 931 2383 625 251 96 7 7456.5 1153.6 772.9 
2012 479 614 1562 3745 997 384 84 11 8328.26 820.37 789.0 
Table 2. Summary by year of parameters extracted from accident reports 
 
 
Fig. 4. Showing the distribution of accident figures (2007 to 2012) across the 36 states and Abuja categorised based on equation 1a, 1b and 2. Note the % distribution of causal factors with 
human factor having 79%. 
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4. Results and discussion  
4.1 Accident causal factor identification 
Table 2 shows a summary of parameters extracted from accident reports. Using the model, it 
was possible to identify the percentage distribution of the classification of causal factors in 
equation 1a and 1b. From Fig. 4 human factors are the most frequent causal factor of accident 
occurrence. From the 2318 accidents recorded nationally from 2007 to 2012, 1830 (79%) 
originated from human factors (DGD = 74%, TPI = 3.8% and AVA 1.2%). 429 accidents (19%) 
originated from nonhuman factors (i.e. Mf = 16%, Br = 2.77% and Bw = 0.23%) while 59 
(2%) were recorded as unknown factors. Further analysis at state level (see Fig.4) also shows 
human factor as the most frequent causal factor across all states and Abuja. These findings 
are revealing because contrary to general perception, bad condition of Nigerian roads 
(Anifowose et al., 2011) and armed robbery and violent attack are not in fact the major 
contributing factors to accidents. In this category, there were a great variety of causes 
including: speed violation, dangerous and wrongful overtaking, route violation, and driving 
under the influence of alcohol and other intoxicants. This is mainly because enforcement is 
lacking (Oluwadiya et al., 2009).   
By identifying the main accident causal factor, regulators have opportunity for formulation 
and deployment of risk mitigation strategies to address the specific nature of the causal 
factors. In this case since human factors have been identified as predominant across all states, 
regulators can design an inclusive and interactive Safety and Environmental Management 
System (SEMS). The SEMS should target improving culture, behaviour and perception 
towards personal and process safety specific to the context of the petroleum transport 
operations and regulatory regime as suggested in Grote (2012).  
4.2 Identification of accident hotspots 
The 3×3 risk matrix shown in Fig. 5 was developed using equation 5. States were classified 
in the matrix based on their relative accident casualty consequence values. The figure 
illustrates the average relative value for all states within the years under consideration. The 
distribution of accidents across the nation was also plotted in a map of Nigeria in Fig. 6.  
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Fig. 5. A 3 × 3 risk matrix showing states ranked based on average yearly accident frequencies and accident casualty 
consequence. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Map of Nigeria showing distribution of truck tanker accidents (2007 to 2012) across all states and Abuja within the 
NNPC petroleum product distribution regions. Note that the dots are not in exact accident positions. (Data representation 
method adopted from Anifowose et al. (2011) 
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Not surprising, states with refineries and import jetties such as Kaduna, Delta, and Lagos 
were identified as high accident risk states, i.e. states with either high accident rate (>10/yr) – 
high consequence value (>61/yr) or high accident rate (10>/yr) – medium consequence value 
(31 – 60/yr). Some of the within this category (e.g. Ogun state, Abuja, Kwara, Kano, Oyo) 
are positioned along key national transport corridors and have high concentration of 
economic activities.  
Equation 3 was used for accident frequency quantification for evaluating the relationship 
between accident occurrences and development of a platform for comparison with acceptable 
risk limits for societal risk, (i.e. the risk or threats from hazard which impact the society) and 
individual risk, (i.e. how individual personally see risk from a hazard).  
 
Fig. 7. Accident quartile frequency classification per state per year 
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In Fig. 7 four maps of Nigeria were developed using ArcGIS based on established accident 
frequencies for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 for all state. Relative accident frequencies for 
2007 and 2008 were not computed because only four years (2009-2012) records of total 
product distribution by state can be traced. Hence relative accident frequency was computed 
with 4 years data only. The  values were then classified into four limits for each year 
independent of preceding or succeeding year using the quartile frequency values (Armitage et 
al., 2008) obtained across the 36 states and Abuja. This classification was used in the map to 
classify states as: very high, high, medium and low accident frequencies states. The aim here 
is to have a broad view of accident distribution across each state using normalised data so as 
to identify patterns that can be used for regulatory purposes. The figure shows consistency in 
the pattern of accidents, with states such as Ogun, Kwara, Kogi, Oyo, Benue, and Akwa-
Ibom maintaining either very high or high accident frequency per truck tanker trip over the 
four years considered.  
By identifying accident risk hotspots, regulatory authorities can channel scarce resources to 
such locations. Hence with this knowledge, FRSC can invest in traffic management strategies 
by enhancing the frequency of patrols specifically in such states while also integrating 
lessons from states with low accident frequencies. Similarly, NEMA, NOSDRA and State 
Fire Departments can strategically position their stations so as to improve emergency 
preparedness, accident response and spill clean-up operations. Operators can also design 
driving training manuals and integrate considerations for these high risk locations. 
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Fig. 8. Time series of monthly accidents 
 
The time series graphs (in Fig.8), shows consistently high numbers of accidents in the month 
of December of the years under consideration. This can be associated with the traveling 
culture in Nigeria during the Christmas season which results in more demand for petroleum 
products and an elevated traffic volume. This result can also help in guiding the yearly 
distribution of regulatory activities. 
4.3 Accident consequence 
Of the 2318 accidents, 39% resulted in injuries of various degrees, 9% resulted in only 
fatalities while 33% resulted in both injuries and fatalities. Using eqn. 6, to calculate the 
cumulative frequency of the number of deaths, accident consequences were categorised based 
on fatalities i.e. category 1, accidents with 1 – 5 deaths; category 2, accidents with 6 – 25 
deaths; category 3, accidents with over 25 deaths (Yang et al., 2010). Of the 972 accidents 
with fatalities, only 3 had fatalities exceeding 25. Notable, amongst this category is the 
Altoada 7
th
 December, 2012 disaster which resulted in the death of 93 people including 
women and children most of whom were scooping fuel from a leaking overturned tanker. 
This is not surprising as poverty has been linked to accidents involving petroleum products in 
Nigeria (Anifowose et al., 2012). Most of the accidents with deaths fall under category 1 with 
approximate cumulative frequency of 0.89, while category 2 accidents have an approximate 
frequency of 0.11. 
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A 2-tailled Kendell’s tau non-parametric correlation between: (a) number of accidents and 
number of fatalities; and (b) number of accidents and number of injuries shows positive 
correlation between both comparisons (see Fig 9 and 10). As expected, the results (illustrated 
in Tables 3 and 4) show minimum positive correlation strength between accident rate and 
fatality of +0.435 and maximum correlation strength of +0.650 in 2011 and 2009 respectively. 
Similarly, 2008 and 2010 recorded peak correlation strengths between accident figure and 
injury figure of +0.677 while a minimum strength of +0.532 was recorded in 2011 at 0.01 
confidence levels. The strong relationship between accident rate and casualty consequence 
may be attributed to a poor accident emergency response regime in Nigeria. Accident 
response is often attended to by federal responders mostly stationed in large cities hours away 
from most incident locations. This makes communications and response slow and fragmented. 
To ensure effective accident response and possibly reduce this correlation strength, local 
capabilities need to be enhanced. Using the strategies discussed in section 4.2, these 
capabilities can be enhanced based on priorities for accident hot-spots and within accident 
prone months. 
 
Fig. 9. Scattered plot showing correlation between accident figure and fatality figure across all 36 state and the 
Abuja. 
 
Correlation coefficient (accident 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
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fig. vs fatality fig) 0.595** 0.606** 0.650** 0.539** 0.435** 0.621** 
No. of state data input  N=26 N=33 N=34 N=37 N=36 N=33 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3. Correlation coefficient of 2 tailed Kendall’s tau nonparametric between accident figure and fatality figure (2007 to 
2012) 
Also, at least 70 % of the accidents resulted in LOC with PMS accounting for 81.55%, AGO 
10.07% and HHK 8.38% of the LOC classification by product type. Lack of adherence to 
quality standards in tuck tanker construction has largely been associated to high percentage of 
LOCs in accidents (Dare et al., 2009) which increases safety and environmental 
consequences. This can also in part be attributed to the fact that being a developing country, 
Nigeria depends largely on imported technology. Hence, where this technology is 
inaccessible locals make do with substandard local technology. Clearly, broader socio-
economic issues need to be addressed in managing accident risk in Nigeria. For example, the 
recent policy on ban of importation of used vehicles into Nigeria needs to be vigorously 
implemented as this will promote inflow of companies with regulated standard truck and 
vehicle manufacturing plants. This, hopefully, will improve the standard of truck tanker 
construction and maintenance. 
Fig. 10. Scattered plot showing correlation between accident figure and injury figure across all 36 state and 
Abuja.  
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Correlation coefficient (accident fig. 
vs injury fig) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
0.669** 0.677** 0.659** 0.677** 0.532** 0.636** 
No. of state data input N=26 N=33 N=34 N=37 N=36 N=33 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4. Correlation coefficient of 2 tailed Kendall’s tau nonparametric between accident figure and injury figure (2007 to 
2012) 
4.4 Accident and financial loss 
Table 5 compares the total national quantity (by year) of petroleum product sold/distributed 
and the corresponding quantity loss from truck tanker incidents. From the comparison, it can 
be seen that 2009 recorded a peak loss value of 11,287,700 litres accounting for 0.12% of the 
total distributed volume for that year while a minimum loss value of 51,345,000 litres (0.05%) 
was recorded in 2007. The table also shows the corresponding vehicle assets damaged. The 
extent of damage to the assets was not reported, hence, further cost evaluation was not 
considered. 
 
Year Product sale/distribution per year 
(PMS, HHK and AGO) (10
3
l) 
Recorded product loss due 
to truck accident. (10
3
l) 
(PMS, HHK, AGO) 
% Loss Damaged 
assets (No. of 
vehicles) 
2007 10111166.2 5134.5 0.05 342 
2008 10429768.43 8635.2 0.08 518 
2009 9423715.55 11287.7 0.12 665 
2010 13423297.54 9743.5 0.07 686 
2011 12662114.38 9383 0.07 625 
2012 12527533.79 9937.63 0.08 997 
Table 5. Percentage (%) product loss and property damage 
By multiplying the quantity loss for each product type with the pump price of product as at 
the year under consideration, an estimated monetary value of the loss in Naira and dollars 
was obtained as shown in Table 6.  
 2007 2008 2009 
 Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implicatio
n (N) 
Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implication 
(N) 
Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implication 
(N) 
          
PMS 65 4095400 266201000 70 6712400 469868000 65 9600000 624000000 
HHK 50 528400 26420000 50 893400 44670000 50 642200 32110000 
AGO 60 510700 30642000 150 1029400 154410000 150 1045500 156825000 
 Total (N) 323263000  668948000  812935000 
 Total ($) 2155087  4459653  5419567 
 2010   2011   2012   
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 Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implicatio
n (N) 
Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implication 
(N) 
Pump 
price 
(N) 
Product 
loss 
Cost 
implication 
(N) 
          
PMS 65 7943400 516321000 65 7456500 484672500 97 8328258 807841026 
HHK 50 908800 45440000 50 772900 38645000 50 789000 39450000 
AGO 150 891300 133695000 150 1153600 173040000 150 820370 123055500 
 Total (N) 695456000  696357500  970346526 
 Total ($) 4636373  4642383  6468977 
Table 6. Cost estimation of product loss @ $1 = N150. 
In Table 7, the cost impact of fatalities and injuries were estimated using the data extracted 
from a study by Battelle (Battelle, 2001). In the study, injuries and deaths were valued to be 
the amount the United States Department of Transport (USDOT) would be willing to spend 
to avoid an injury or death. This averaged out to be $200,000 to avoid an injury and 
$2,800,000 to avoid a fatality. Similarly, the study estimated that for a typical full tanker spill 
of 33,000 litres (8000 gl), $7,000 of environmental damage would be incurred. The study, 
however, considered the dollar value as at 1996 and the cost of environmental damage was 
evaluated after an assumption that the spill was cleaned up. Hence, for this study, the 
extrapolated 2014 dollar value was used. From the analysed accident reports, it is unclear 
whether spills were cleaned up. Therefore, for the purpose of simplicity, similar assumption 
was made on spill clean-up and the extrapolated 2014 dollar value for environmental damage 
was also adopted. 
From Tables 6 and 7, the accident cost impact categories considered, (i.e. fatality, injury, 
environmental damage and product loss) cost transport operators in the downstream sector of 
the Nigerian economy an approximate sum of $16.32b US dollars from 2007 to 2012. 
Notably, of the total evaluated amount, fatalities account for $13.63b.  
Year Fatality Estimate cost 
impact ($) 
 
 
Injury Estimated cost 
impact ($) 
Quantity 
loss 
Environmental damage 
cost impact ($) 
2007 369 1832347728  741 262827513 5134500 13648985.02 
2008 434 2155119008  1124 398674932 8635200 22954857.42 
2009 434 2155119008  1345 477062085 11287700 30005969.07 
2010 519 2577204528  1405 498343665 9743500 25901039.15 
2011 374 1857176288  931 330219183 9383000 24942725.95 
2012 614 3048947168  1562 554030466 9937630 26417092.8 
Total cost  13625913728   2521157844  143870669.4 
Table 7. Accident cost impact estimation. Note: the dollar value used = extrapolated dollar value in 2014. Where $1 ≈ 
N84.58 in 1996 and $1 ≈ N150 in 2014 
Further evaluation also shows that the downstream sector losses are on average $2.72b per 
year on accidents, with each accident costing an average value of $7,040,001. This has 
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negative investment implications to the estimated $106.7b (Okulaja, 2013) economic value of 
the downstream sector. The amount could be even more if other direct cost variables such as 
clean-up cost, property damage, cost of evacuation of victims, and traffic incident delay cost 
or indirect cost variables such as: cost of litigation and persecution, fines, reputational 
damage, increase in insurance premium, etc. were considered.  
Taking these observations into consideration, it should be noted that we integrated cost 
analysis results in the context of establishing a general estimate or bound on the financial 
impact of this problem rather than a precise valuation. Clearly, in Nigeria, accident cost is not 
as high as estimated based on U.S. data and this perhaps could be the reason many transport 
company pay less attention to human safety and the environment in their operations. If the 
cost here was applicable to the Nigerian system, the companies will have strong incentives to 
adhere to good safety measures. Therefore, by using this model regulators can make a 
systematic attempt to benchmark the financial implications of the problem based on the best 
available data. Hence, meaningful policy inferences can be derived for risk management 
purposes.  
5. Conclusion 
A framework for reducing accidents by improving regulation of transportation of petroleum 
products by road was presented using a set of disparate spatiotemporal data obtained from 
several sources in Nigeria. The framework provides contextual understanding of accidents 
which can be used to improve decisions on distribution of regulatory resources across 
geographical locations. 
Of the 2318 accidents analysed, over 75% were caused by human factors associated to 
dangerous driving. Regulatory effort, therefore, need to concentrate on limiting human 
accident causal factors. Using the method of computing accident frequencies and 
consequences per trip-yr to a geographical location(s), and time series analysis, regulators can 
identify accident prone locations and likely accident disposed periods so as to expand their 
presence and improve their effectiveness in light of limited regulatory resources. The 
accident risk assessment conducted also estimated the dollar value of accidents using 
established cost of fatality, injury, product loss and environmental damage. On average, it 
was estimated that the average value of a single accident cost over 7 million USD. The cost 
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dimension can also be used as motivation for policy development aimed at improving the risk 
perception of operators.  
Although the study showed how risk assessment can be conducted using fragmented data, 
such data has clearly constrained the depth of some elements of analysis. Hence, we 
recommended that the stakeholders identified in this study should create a joint accident 
database to support the quality of future research.  
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